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It is sometimes said that only a cricket match or a war can unite the 
people of India The stereotypes are well-known the perennial Hindu- 
Muslim communal divide the relatively recent Sikh unrest in Punjab 
resulting in a wider Hmdu-Sikh distrust, the frequent, though considerably 
restrained, Hindu-Christian rivalries in some parts of the country, friction 
between followers of the same faith (e g caste problems among the Hindus, 
Shia-Sunm riots, and the Sikh faith s vicious differences between Nirankans 
and Radha Soamis) There is also social strife due to tribalism and socio­
economic tensions, epitomized by the recent massacres in Bihar, which even 
the Indian media now treat with the same cynical disdain displayed by their 
western counterparts for the ferryboat disasters of Bangladesh
In addition, India has states constituted on a linguistic basis (except for 
some in the northeastern region) In large part because of this, at least 20 of 
India s 25 states are involved in disputes with their neighbors over issues of 
territory, water or language Riots take place frequently, and even the use of 
armed police force by one state against another is not unusual The extreme 
example here is the border dispute between Assam and Nagaland, two states 
that were once one In 1980, and again in early 1986, the armed police forces 
of the two states fought with each other, resulting m more than 125 
confirmed deaths Other prominent examples are Punjab and Haryana,which 
are involved in a highly publicized dispute over land, waters and even a state 
capital The most surprising conflict is that between Haryana and Uttar
2
Pradesh These states have experienced recurrent tension over territories 
along the Yamuna river, even though they both fall within the Hindi-belt, 
share a common language and, even in the area of dispute, speak the same 
dialect, and share religious, social, and economic characteristics
With a few exceptions, each Indian state has one or more linguistic, 
tribal, or social minority demanding a province of its own Some of the 
better known examples follow In West Bengal, the Darjeeling Hills 
Gurkhas demand for a separate province of their own (Gurkhaland) the 
Jharkhand movement among the backward tribals in Bihar and the on- 
again-off-again agitation by the hillmen in Uttar Pradesh for a new hill state 
Uttarkhand Other examples include the plains tribals who draw several 
small circles on the map of Assam to denote their mythical state of 
Udayachal, the Bastar movement in Madhya Pradesh, and the now-defunct 
Telangana agitation in Andhra Pradesh
Even miniscule tribal states with populations of barely one million 
have to live with similar pressures The following instances can be cited the 
Hynmewtrep movement in rain-drenched Meghalaya, which demands a 
separate province for the dominant Khasi and Jaintia tribes (while the Garos 
are left to fend for themselves), the demand by less than a hundred thousand 
Kukis for a state of their own in neighboring Manipur, and, occasionally, 
similar claims made by the dominant Ao Naga tribe in Nagaland and less 
than 50,000 Chakma tribesmen, who constitute an oppressed minority in the 
new state of Mizoram
Frequently, these conflicts are irretrievably enmeshed with deeper and 
broader aspects of ethnic and linguistic strife The communal (religious) 
angle is, fortunately, not usually involved Exceptions to this are the 
Christian Mizos and Buddhist Chakmas, Hindu M ateis and Christian hill
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tribes in Manipur and, to a lesser extent ,the Buddhist Bhutia-Lepchas and 
Hindu Nepalis in Sikkim 1
I have presented this broad sketch to emphasize the point that India is 
fraught with problems that make it the most fractious democracy in the 
world Before and after Independence, India has had an unenviable record of 
civil strife in one region or the other Very often the strife has had shades of 
separatism and every once in a while a separatist movement has raised 
doubts about India s very survival as a nation-state And yet India has 
survived, absorbing most of the separatist movements in its huge 
constitutional entity, just as most of the invasions across the northwest were 
absorbed into the mainstream of society during the course of India s history
With this discussion of India s continuing internal strife and its rather 
unusual recent history of dealing with the problem as background, what are 
India s options and its prospects as it tackles the greatest challenge to its 
nationhood since Independence the separatist agitation in Punjab There are 
already a number of excellent studies of this challenge This essay takes a new 
approach by comparing and contrasting the Punjab problem with the thirty 
year-old trouble in another region of the Subcontinent, northeast India 
There the government has had constantly to wage a battle against strong 
armed and highly motivated separatist forces m the tmy, but strategically 
located, states of Nagaland, Manipur Mizoram and, to a smaller extent, 
Tripura The Indian government has also had to deal with a tremendous 
crisis in the mam northeastern state of Assam where a popular mass-based 
agitation against the infiltration of illegal migrants from Bangladesh crippled
1 In the English language media in India we make a distinction between Nepalis (Nepali 
speaking Indian citizens) and Nepalese (immigrants from Nepal)
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the states economy, stopped the flow of its crude oil to inland refineries and 
resulted m nearly 7,000 deaths 1
While I have drawn on the analyses of others, the discussion here is 
based not so much on published texts as on my own experiences, interviews, 
and notes over the course of a decade of news reporting in the northeast and 
Punjab The situation in these two regions which are separated by 1 800 
miles of land and a broad span of cultural, ethnic, and economic differences 
offers some insights into Indias plans for long-term strategy in Punjab and 
more broadly, into the security and stability not only of India but the 
bordering nation of Pakistan
TWO REGIONS
So that I might remain true to my journalistic roots, let me recount a 
telling anecdote from my reporting notebook in Punjab On the afternoon of 
June 2, 1984, just a day before the army began moving into Punjab for 
Operation Bluestar 2 I was among a small group of newsmen who climbed up 
the building of the 200-year-old Brahm Buta Akhara (a semi-religious shrine 
or gathering place) overlooking the Golden Temple complex a rectangular 
conglomeration of buildings about the size of four city blocks and sacred to 
the Sikhs Because of its strategic location, the armed soldiers of the Central 
Reserve Police Force (CRPF, India s paramilitary national gendarme) had 
occupied the Akhara for months keeping an eye on the Golden Temple with 
field-glasses and rifles This had obviously resulted in tension between the 
police and the extremists, both sides were peeping out of their sand-bagged
1 The Assam agitation and violence has been dealt with in detail in my book Assam A Villcv 
Divided (New Delhi Vikas 1984)
2The Assam agitation and violence have been dealt with in detail in my book Assim A 
Valiev Divided (New Delhi Vikas 1984)
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and brick-and-concrete battlements Just two days before our arrival, the 
strain had taken its toll The police and the extremists had exchanged 
thousands of rounds of fire resulting m 16 deaths
The newsmen visiting the Akhara were briefed by a junior officer of 
the CRPF who proudly introduced to us a slit-eyed jawan (trooper) of his 
battalion The jawan, he said, had nearly been killed by sniper fire from 
inside But, said the officer, he reacted quickly and proved that he was the 
best shot in the battalion The jawan added for effect I was the one who 
gave that clock a whole burst, he said, pointing at the shattered remnants of 
a clock-tower at one of the temple entrances
The jawan was rather garrulous, certainly unlike the Gurkha that 
many of us newsmen had presumed him to be As it later turned out, he was 
from the northeastern state of Manipur and was recruited there while the 
same CRPF battalion was involved in local counterinsurgency operations It 
was hard for us to conceal our surprise at the unusual enthusiasm with 
which he talked — Indian troopers are, more often than not quiet and shy of 
civilians Finally an explanation was forthcoming from the jawan himself 
With articulation uncommon for a mere rifleman he said For years the 
Punjabis have come, beaten us up and insulted our women, because they said 
they had to keep India together Now see what I did yesterday
With that simple statement he summed up the changing fortunes of 
these two utterly dissimilar and most distant regions of India and the reversal 
of roles for their peoples From being India s sword arm and the guardian of 
national unity Punjab has now become India s greatest challenge It is thus 
natural that people tend to compare Punjab with the northeast, sometimes 
with sweeping generalizations Many government officials often say We 
sorted out the northeast, we will sort out Punjab And m several interviews
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Sikh extremists have repeated to me The governments should not 
underestimate Punjab This is not the northeast
The two situations have striking similarities and crucial differences 
The campaign of terror in Punjab today feeds on a minority s feeling of 
alienation — as was the case with the tribal insurgencies in the northeast It 
has a certain degree of popular support even if it is not quite as strong as it 
was in the case of the Mizo and Naga rebels And the Sikhs are sustained to 1 
considerable extent by arms training, guidance and logistical back-up from 
Pakistan, just as the Chinese-backed rebels in the northeast operated from 
sanctuaries what was then East Pakistan In both cases, the trouble came from 
sensitive border states
But there are also vital differences that, unfortunately make a solution 
to the Punjab crisis a much tougher proposition
— First, neither the Naga Mizo or Mampuri guerillas of the troubled 
northeast were driven by an all-consuming religious fervor While the 
Nagas and, to some extent, the Mizos did draw some sustenance from the 
Baptist Church, this was incidental and not central to their motivations As a 
matter of fact in both cases the church and the pastors, rather than urging the 
youths to fight, constituted a vital middle ground They were close to the 
extremists and yet remained m communication with the government The 
experience in Nagaland, as well as Mizoram has shown that it was because of 
the efforts of the Church there that the government was able to achieve 
results through negotiations 1 Incidentally, a similar hope was held in some 
circles for Darshan Singh Ragi, the Sikh head priest m the Golden Temple
1 For in depth study of the role of the Christian church and pastors in peacemaking in 
Nagaland and particularly Rev Zairema in Mizoram see Nirmal Niabcdon s Nagaland The 
Night of the Guerillas and Mizoram The Dagger Brigade (New Delhi Lancers 1978 and 1979 
respectively)
7
However, he could not retain the confidence of the extremists and left the 
Temple m the first week of August Since the northeastern tribals 
motivations were purely political, it was possible to assuage them with the 
offer of regional power within the framework of the constitution In the case 
of Sikh extremists, religion was an additional complicating factor
— Second, unlike Punjab, none of the rebellions in the northeast 
involved the leading, frontline Indian communities The rebels were all 
tribal minorities and ranged against them were people from Punjab and the 
other parts of what is sometimes termed mainland India The northeastern 
rebellion remained at most a distant blur in the mmd of the average Indian 
He knew that the army was fighting some misguided tribals in some part of 
his country, but it did not really matter In fact, it was often said that the 
average Indian knew more about the Eritrean insurgency than about what 
was happening in Nagaland Punjab is entirely different Every little 
development there registers on the minds of the entire nation, and with 
special intensity m India s northern political hub
— Third, the trouble in the northeast was perceived to be a fight 
between some tribes and the government and not m any way a part of the 
national political process Thus when, on April 1967, a wad of plastique 
planted by Naga rebels (trained in what was then East Pakistan) blew up 65 
passengers travelling in the Tinsukia-New Jalpaigun passenger tram near 
Lumdmg in Assam close to the Nagaland border, it did not cause any 
outrage 1 Contrast this with what happened in July, when Hindu bus 
passengers were massacred by suspected Sikh terrorists in Haryana, the
 ^ Even before this an explosion in a train had resulted in 10 deaths Interestingly the 
explosions were taking place just when mediation efforts were in a crucial stage Compare this 
with the trend m Punpb where major terrorist strikes have a msty habit of occurring whenever 
pei cernì king efforts seem to be getting somewhere
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neighboring province of Punjab A major Punjab-related incident can easily 
cause trouble as far away as Bombay, if not Cochin
— Finally, m the same vein, the fight in the northeast was purely 
between the state and the tribes It did not involve selective killings of 
innocent people from a particular community as is the case in Punjab There 
were, of course, some aberrations in the dying phase of the Mizo insurgency 
when the guerillas served the quit notice on all non-Mizos and killed a few 
plainsmen Barring that, the rebels targets were well defined and thus the 
battlelmes were clearer
These differences have brought entirely new security problems to the 
Punjab For example, at the operational level it presents hard choices for 
officials who have learned their counter-insurgency expertise m the northeast 
(a fact admitted by the military) Police and intelligence officials m Punjab 
confess that, for the first time ever, they are facing the dilemma of fighting 
their own In the northeast they simply told their troops in Punjabi that they 
were there to fight the enemy, and the jawans did the rest But the harsher 
methods used in the northeast — a scorched earth policy in Nagaland and 
village regrouping in Mizoram — would never work in Punjab, which is so 
close to Delhi and constantly under the eye of the national and world media 
Just six months after the 22-day India-Pakistan war of 1965, Laldenga and his 
Mizo National Front (MNF) declared independence in Mizoram and on 
February 28, 1966, they even hoisted their flag on the government treasury in 
Aizawl (now the state capital) which was then the headquarters of Mizo Hills 
d istrict1 The government in New Delhi, still recovering from the aftereffects 
of the war, was shocked and retaliated with all the firepower it could muster
* For excellent details of the bombing of Aizawl town again refer to Nibedon s Mizonm The 
Dagger Brigade
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in the region While helicopters dropped troops to save the beleagured 
garrison of the paramilitary Assam Rifles m Aizawl, Indian Air Force fighters 
strafed the town until each one of the rebels had fled It is a cruel irony, but 
can the government ever contemplate such methods in Punjab7
Linked to this, also, is the question of calling out the army in Punjab 
The demand has been raised several times m the recent past by groups within 
the government, the ruling Congress-I party, and by at least one major 
national party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has lost most of its 
orthodox Hindu base o ver the years and now uses the demand for the army 
as a kind of mantra This clamor can also be examined in light of the army s 
experience in the northeast
J LESSONS FROM THE NORTHEAST
In the northeast the army had a slightly different mission Entire tribal 
communities could be and were considered to be hostile There was a state of 
armed conflict, and ambushes and counter-attacks took place all the time In 
Punjab the problem is not an all-out insurgency but one of selective terrorism 
with which the army is neither equipped nor oriented to deal The army 
operates m the minimum strength of a company and the terrorists m the 
maximum strength of four, or at best six Unless they make the mistake of 
concentrating en masse in the Golden Temple yet again the army would 
never find them
Besides the armv s performance in the northeast was sobering In no 
case except perhaps the smaller urban insurgency of Manipur, was the army 
able to kill or capture the major extremist leaders While it fought bravely in 
both Mizoram and Nagaland, it also suffered heavy casualties The armys 
approach paper to the fourth pay commission — an unclassified document — 
states that for fourteen years after the Bangladesh War of 1971 (a period in
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which there was no war with a foreign country), more than 10,000 troops died 
due to operational reasons It is reasonable to presume that not all of them 
died in truck accidents
At the same time, the heavy deployment of troops and some successes 
did help suppress insurgents These then quietly retreated into the jungle 
fastnesses of Burma and Bangladesh, waiting for a more opportune moment 
to strike In fact it was during this period that the Mizo rebels were able to 
stage their most sensational success of all times On January 13, 1975 a Mizo 
hit-squad m police uniforms infiltrated the police headquarters m Aizawl and 
shot to death Inspector-General of Police G H Arya, his deputy L B Sewa, and 
Special Branch Superintendent P Panchapagesan This only resulted in 
intensification of army and the other security operations At the peak of these 
deployments m 1982-83, thirteen army brigades were deployed m the 
counterinsurgency role and, sure enough, in two years they did not even 
have thirteen encounters with the rebels Today, even though there is 
relative peace, the army is unable to disengage and it has set up an entirely 
new counterinsurgency corps at Dimapur in the Nagaland foothills Given 
the high percentage of Punjabis (specifically, Sikhs) in the armed forces, such 
overkill involving permanent troop deployment against civilians would 
have much more serious repercussions m Punjab, itself historically the most 
imperilled frontier of the country
In fact, if any lesson of the northeastern experience is applicable to 
Punjab, it is that rebellions, if tackled properly, run their natural course and, 
after peaking, are susceptible to negotiated settlement In Mizoram, Laldenga 
did not lose to the army Nor was he suddenly pricked by some latent Indian 
patriotism into settling with the Center on very minor political concessions 
and the promise of power He settled because two decades of blood-letting
had convinced him that even if he and the hard core of his followers could 
survive, they were not going to win and realize their ambition of an 
independent Mizoram Laldenga himself is too shrewd to ever admit this 
However, I got a strikingly candid explanation from none other than 
Vanlalzari who, as a teenaged personal secretary to Inspector-general of Police 
Arya, had helped her boyfriend, Lalhelia, plan and execute the January 1975 
killings m the Aizawl police headquarters Serving a life sentence for her 
complicity, Vanlalzari was out on parole when I met her in May, 1986, m the 
MNF office at Aizawl We see no point in going on fighting any longer if we 
can get a reasonable amount of freedom within India, she said, and then 
added with a remarkable sense of logic Sovereignty by itself does not mean 
freedom Poland is sovereign But is it free7
A similar kind of feeling in a strong faction of the Naga underground 
leadership led to their abjuring violence and signing the Shillong peace 
accord of 1975 The bush war and mediation efforts, led at one time by none 
other than the late Jaya Prakash Narayan continued simultaneously for 
several years in Nagaland and succeeded m 1975 only after the insurgency had 
peaked and a majority of its leaders were convinced of the futility of 
continuing the fight There were other reasons, such as in ter-tribal rivalries 
and plain battle weariness, but these were incidental to the decision to sue for 
peace
As a matter of fact, Nagaland's is the fascinating example of the only 
insurgency which might have actually succeeded In 1962, when the Chinese 
reached the foothills of Assam, there was hardly anything the Indian 
government had at its command to stop a takeover by the Nagas who then 
had 12,000 men under arms and who were better equipped than the regular 
Indian army They carried G-3 or Chinese AK-47 semi-automatic weapons,
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while the Indian army was still m the age of 303 bolt action rifles The 
strange fact that the Nagas, trained, armed, and indoctrinated by the Chinese, 
never exploited that opportunity was to me one of the most intriguing 
chapters of northeastern history I raised the question once on a nighttime 
jeep drive with Scato Swu, at the time of the Nagaland state elections in 
October 1962 was the president of the Naga underground 1 He laughed and 
said Yes, I had only to blow the whistle and the two battalions of Madhya 
Pradesh Special Armed Force would have run away My youngsters were 
impatient that I do so But we saw the moment of truth What was better7 
Staying with India, which had a democracy - even if we thought it gave us a 
raw deal - and respect for Christianity, or go under the control of the Chinese 
communists We had all seen what they had done in Tibet and thus it was 
not such a difficult choice to make
Manipur is yet another interesting and different example, as this was 
the only northeastern state where the army had decisive success on the 
ground It captured not only the Nameirakpam Bisheshwar Singh, the 
commander-in-chief of the guerilla s Peoples Liberation Army but also his 
two successors, and liquidated the entire central core of 32 members trained by 
the Chinese in Lhasa Bisheshwar was considered a security risk in the 
Imphal jail and was thus immediately transferred to Varanasi where he spent 
more than two years in preventive detention under the National Security 
Act Eventually, the government had to decide between prosecuting him and 
letting him off Obviously, there were few in Manipur who would stand in 
the witness box against Bisheshwar and a judge from the nearby state of 
Assam had to be named to the special court to prosecute him The judge
hn 1982 he was a nominated member of the Rajya Sabha the upper house of India s 
parliament
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never turned up in Imphal Finally, the only charges the state could bring 
against Bisheshwar were the possession of an unlicensed weapon and the 
attempt to kill the army officer who had led the raid on his hideout This 
against the biggest extremist leader the army had ever captured in three 
decades of fighting insurgencies’1 The government was saved further 
embarrassment as the state elections intervened Bisheshwar contested as an 
independent, won, and was sworn m on the Indian constitution as a member 
of the state legislative assembly
As in the case of Nagaland and Mizoram, this was an instance of the 
Indian political system being able to absorb a separatist movement within 
itself It did this either by sharing power or by making minor constitutional 
concessions (such as giving the tribe the first lien on mineral resources, 
which may or may not exist, and offering restrictions such as requiring inner- 
line permits for the entry of outsiders) Moreover alhough successive Indian 
governments used force against these movements, they were not shy of 
talking to people like Laldenga and Phizo who, at their peak, were much 
more anti-national than even the better known Sikh extremist leaders And 
as the experience of these states has shown, rebels who settle make excellent 
citizens, leaders and even soldiers The cabinets and legislative assemblies in 
Nagaland and Mizoram are full of former self-styled generals and ministers 
Zuheto Serna, who was the commander-m-chief of the Naga underground 
and at one time the most wanted man m the region, commands a battalion of 
the Border Security Force (BSF) He is in fact one of the highest decorated 
officers in the BSF, and most men in his unit are former underground
1 Compare this with the demoralized state of judiciary in Punjab where first of all it is almost 
impossible to bring someone in the witness box against those accused of terrorism Then the 
judges some of whom have been assassinated are under extreme pressure of terrorist retribution
guerillas Similarly the single battalion of Mizoram Armed Police, which has 
had more success against the MNF than the army in recent years, has a 
substantial sprinkling of former rebels It is logical to argue that the trouble in 
Punjab could follow the same graph except that Punjab at least at this 
moment, has some disturbing differences
THE PUNJAB CASE
Punjab is different First, every single incident in Punjab (and related 
to Punjab) has the potential of bringing retaliation elsewhere in the country 
This has resulted in a chain reaction making it increasingly unpopular for 
any government in New Delhi to initiate the process of reconciliation 
Second, who is there to talk to7 In Mizoram, for example, the government 
negotiated with Laldenga who, in turn, commanded the loyalty of the rebels 
and was their unquestioned leader In return for political concessions he 
delivered peace The Sikh terrorists have no Laldenga, nobody who can offer 
peace m return for political concessions With the benefit of hindsight it is 
now possible to put the failure of the Rajiv-Longowal accord on Punjab in 
some perspective It can now be said that an accord need not have been 
signed with somebody not in a position to deliver peace In the coming 
months the same question will crop up again and again If Barnala was 
considered incapable of delivering peace in return for Chandigarh and river 
waters, can the other former chief ministers and rebel Akali leaders, Parkash 
Singh Badal, Gurcharan Singh Tohra, and Baba Jogmder Singh the aging 
father of late Sant Bhindranwale, give peace m return for Sikh detenus in the 
Jodhpur jail or m return for a Kashmir-like constitutional status71
1 Under Article 370 of Indian constitution the state of Jammu and Kashmir has been accorded 
some special privileges that give it greater autonomy than the other states of the union
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Most of the moderate and even middleground leaders m Punjab today 
are not the leaders of the rebellion They are purely part players firing the 
gun from the terrorists shoulder, as the saying goes, (or from the hip, 
which is perhaps more apt in a context where the submachine gun is the 
weapon of choice) The problem in Punjab is that, so far, the Sikh protest is 
not orchestrated by a figure such as Laldenga, Phizo or Bishehwar Singh, an 
unchallenged leader who calls the shots The terrorists at present are a few 
groups of highly committed youngsters on a mission of murder
Given this background, the Punjab paradox is that the way out can only 
begin with a long wait During that wait the police and intelligence anti­
terrorist operations must be beefed up, while simultaneously pleading with 
the rest of the country not to treat every new incident of killing in Punjab as a 
national calamity This should not be misunderstood as a suggestion for 
increased repression nor do I wish to imply that repression will solve the 
problem in Punjab On the other hand I am suggesting avoidance of 
overreaction it could either result in panic and too many hasty concessions 
without getting any tangible returns It could also lead to a full-scale army 
operation which, as I have tried to argue at some length, will bring no gams at 
all Punjab has to be treated as another of the ethno-security problems that 
have periodically surfaced during India s continuing search for its national 
identity, a problem that the Indian leadership and polity are familiar with
Politically too, it has to be a waiting game -- waiting for a credible new 
Sikh leadership, m fact a credible extremist leadership, to emerge And that 
leadership must be convinced that no matter what the score m terms of 
bodies, the extremists cannot win against the might of the Indian state power 
and the collective will of an overwhelming majority of the nation Only at 
that stage can the idea of a negotiated settlement have any lasting meaning
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